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Thank you very much. It is really an honor and a pleasure for me
to be here with you today. I have had a chance to sit through the
morning session and that wonderful group of panelists, which I think
really gave you a very good tour of the major issues that the world
faces on climate change over the years immediately ahead.
This is an amazing moment we are at today. I am someone who
has been following the climate issue closely since it first emerged on
the world scene at the very end of the 1980s, leading up, of course,
to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Clearly, we are now
at a moment that is at least comparable to the historical turning point
that occurred at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.
The challenge we face, though, is that in looking back at what has
been accomplished since that period in the early 1990s, it is clear
that most of the hopes and aspirations expressed by world leaders, by
environmental organizations, and by scientists, have not even come
close to being realized.
In fact, I was recently going back and reading an article I wrote in
1988. I must say that in some ways, it was shocking to see that
things that I and many others were urging at that time, which seemed
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obvious then, are being discussed today with the same sense of ur-
gency. But the challenge is that this time, we do not have the luxury
of getting it wrong. We cannot miss the current opportunity pre-
sented by the kind of public awareness, the kind of readiness to act,
that world leaders expressed at the United Nations last week.
I am firmly convinced, based on the science that I have read, and
particularly the new reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, that we are within, by the estimation of most scien-
tists, ten to twenty years of hitting a tipping point with the world's
climate, where a substantial amount of really damaging climate
change is going to become inevitable. I
Particularly, as I look around at the students in this room, I think it
is very important to reiterate what many people know and what
many people have stated earlier today, that unless we get a handle on
this problem, unless we turn around the trend of greenhouse gas
emissions, we are going to be looking at a substantially degraded
world, one that is much less able to support human economic and
social development than the one that we have today.
The poor are going to suffer the most, but I must say, even sitting
here in the wonderful riches of Manhattan, this is not the kind of
crisis that even the wealthiest people are going to be able to avoid.
One of the things I think is most striking is that over the million
years that it took for humans to evolve from very primitive primates,
the carbon dioxide concentration on the earth has never exceeded
300 parts per million up until recently. Sure, there is climate vari-
ability. There were even several ice ages and several warm periods
during that period. But during that entire period carbon dioxide,
which plays a key regulatory role, both causing and responding to
temperature changes, never went above 300 parts per million.
Ladies and gentlemen, today we are over 380 parts per million. If
this were a warning gauge in an aircraft that was running short of
fuel, all of the red lights would be going off right now.
The challenge is this. The climate system, it turns out, is not this
sort of steady, immutable thing - the atmosphere, the oceans. If
you examine what has happened in the remote past, you can see that
the climate flips dramatically into very different conditions.
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/
ar4_syr.pdf.
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There was actually a time, tens of millions of years ago, long be-
fore there was anything like humans on the earth, when the concen-
tration of carbon dioxide was significantly above even where it is
today. That was a period when palm trees grew at the North Pole
and the sea level was 200 feet higher than it is today. That is not a
world with which we are familiar, and it is not a world with which
we, approaching 7 billion people and eventually 9 billion people on
the planet, 2 are prepared to cope.
So there is an extraordinary urgency. At some point we melt the
ice cap over the Arctic. Suddenly the Arctic Ocean starts to absorb
all that heat. Greenland is sitting right next to the Arctic Ocean.
You lose enough ice off of Greenland, if it all goes, that alone would
raise the sea level by twenty feet.
The other thing that happens as you start to raise the temperature
dramatically in the far northern reaches of Canada and Siberia, is
that there is an enormous amount of carbon that would be released
both in the form of carbon dioxide and also as methane, which is a
far more powerful greenhouse gas. If we don't get this trend turned
around in the next couple of decades, the earth itself is going to start
adding potentially as much or more carbon dioxide as we already
are. That is the true nightmare scenario.
Let me now shift to what we are going to do about all of this.
You have already heard, I think, a lot of very good ideas about
policies and about technologies this morning, and I am not going to
try to repeat all of that, much of which I agree with.
But I want to make one fairly simple point. That is that we need a
fundamental transformation of the energy economy as the real cen-
terpiece of dealing with this problem. You are not going to solve
this problem by planting a few trees, by shifting even all of our light
bulbs to a different kind. We are not going to get to it all by any one
simple means.
What we are going to need is a technology transformation, which
needs to be accompanied by some lifestyle transformations. The two
I think are really part of the same thing. I urge you not to think
about them as extraordinarily separate, because I think that is a mis-
take that a lot of people make.
2. Department of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Division, The World at
Six Billion, 6, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.154 (Oct. 12, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbillion.htm.
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Now, why do I say a transformation is needed? The reason a
transformation is needed is that we basically have an energy system
that is 85 percent dependent on fossil fuels3 , most of which are used
in an extraordinarily inefficient way. We need to rebuild that energy
system in the 2l t century to move into a post-petroleum age.
We have to do something that is as dramatic as our ancestors did
100 years ago. Remember this age of oil isn't all that old. Human
societies existed for thousands of years without burning any fossil
fuels, but the modern industrial system that we have today, which
emerged in the 2 0 th century, was highly dependent on burning a lot
of fossil fuels.
What we need to do now is to create a different energy system,
which I think has to have two fundamental characteristics. First, it
has to be far more efficient, and waste a lot less energy, which
means doing things in a much smarter way - for example, not mov-
ing around quite as much as we do today. Secondly, it has to be
based on non-fossil, non-carbon-based energy sources, principally
renewable energy sources.
That transformation I think is not as far off and is not going to
prove nearly as difficult or as expensive as most people, and particu-
larly most energy executives, think it is going to be. The reason is
that I think we can make many of the same kinds of changes based
on technology that allowed us to, for example, achieve an informa-
tion revolution over the last few decades, and to do it a lot more
quickly and a lot less expensively than anyone could have envi-
sioned if you were trying to estimate what was possible back in the
1960s.
The process of economic change, once it gets going - and of
course it needs guidance from government policy - begins to feed
on itself. Lower-cost technologies fuel more investment, the in-
vestment, in turn, creates even lower-cost technologies, and the
process continues forward.
Of course, while today the halls of Congress are full of fossil fuel
lobbyists that are trying to block change, once things start to move
forward, these new industries and these new technologies will have
their own advocates. In fact, they are already starting to play a sig-
nificant role in the process of change in this particular arena.
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY SOURCES: FOSSIL FUELS (2008),
http://www.energy.gov/energysources/fossilfuels.htm.
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The analysis by Rob Sokolow and Stephen Pecala at Princeton,
4
laid out this set of wedges, with which you can basically divide the
pie of emissions reductions into these billion-ton pieces. I think that
was really quite a brilliant presentation that those two gentlemen
developed, because it allows you to sort of think about this problem
in discrete and challenging but manageable pieces.
I think that what they say is that about half of the wedges that they
have identified would be needed to get to stabilizing carbon emis-
sions at the current level by 2050. Unfortunately, I think we are ac-
tually probably going to have to do better than that. Many scientists
and many governments have now recognized - particularly the
European governments and Japan, and I think Australia has now
recognized this, and the U.S. may actually be getting close as well
- that we probably need as much as a 50 percent reduction by 2050
and then further decline after that to avoid that dangerous level of
wanning over 2 degrees Centigrade.
To get to that, it is key that the wedges we choose - and I would
describe it as something that must be an integrated technological and
economic transformation - have to be those that are the most cost-
effective and have to be ones that are really practical going forward.
I don't think that government planners can really choose those
wedges today. I think you are going to have to let both policy forces
and market forces to some degree play themselves out.
I think that, rather than taking things off the table today - you
know, I am not particularly a fan of nuclear power, mainly because I
think it has been an economic disaster rather than because I am par-
ticularly concerned about radioactive waste - still, I do not think we
are in a position today where we can just ad hoc take things off the
table. I think we need to look at all of the alternatives and create a
level playing field which includes of course pricing carbon at an ap-
propriate level, and then the marketplace ultimately will take hold.
Probably the technological solution that is getting the most atten-
tion in a lot of circles, particularly here in the United States, is car-
bon capture and sequestration. Again, I think that that is a very im-
portant technology. It would certainly potentially allow us to con-
tinue using fossil fuels, while putting the carbon dioxide back into
the ground.
4. See ROBERT SOCOLOW, ROBERTA HOTINSKI, JEFFERY B. GREENBLATT &
STEPHEN PACALA, SOLVING THE CLIMATE PROBLEM: TECHNOLOGIES AVAILABLE
TO CuRB C02 EMISSIONS (2004), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-cmi/
resources/CMIResourcesnewfiles/Environ_08-21 a.pdf.
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I do think, though, that for those who have not studied this tech-
nology, it is important to be aware of the range of technological hur-
dles that actually face that technology.
One place you could potentially put this carbon dioxide is in de-
pleted oil and gas fields. Somebody recently did an estimate of all of
the depleted oil and gas fields - and there are, by the way, a lot of
depleted oil and gas fields in Texas. In fact most of them are de-
pleted at this point. Somebody did an estimate of all of those fields,
some of the richest original reservoirs that existed ever, and looked
at what kind of storage capacity exists there. It turns out that if you
took only the coal-fired power plants that are planned in Texas, you
could fill up all of those reservoirs with carbon dioxide within a dec-
ade or two. The scale of what is needed means we are going to have
to get well beyond depleted oil and gas reserves. We are going to
have to figure out entirely new geological strata, perhaps deep
oceans being another burial source.
In addition, there is going to be a huge pipeline network that will
be required to connect the power plants to the geological structures
that are appropriate for putting that material in place. Someone es-
timated that to deal with all of the coal-fired power plants we have
today in the United States, you would literally have to replicate the
scale of the current natural gas pipeline system in the United States,
which is an immense structure built up over many, many decades,
and which cost hundreds of millions of dollars, just in terms of the
transportation part of it.
And then of course, at the upstream end, the basic technologies of
being able to separate out and to control at an economical price the
carbon dioxide are very much remaining to be developed.
The bottom line is that carbon capture and sequestration may or
may not turn out to be a viable technology for disposing of some of
the carbon dioxide, but two things it is not. One, no one would ar-
gue it is a complete solution, because it doesn't work for things like
automobiles (the mobile sources of emissions) let alone households.
Secondly, it is not going to be fast. The first commercial plant to
do carbon capture and sequestration, the earliest that that possibly
could come online, according to the optimists and advocates, is
2020. That's one plant. And of course we are talking about having
to build literally hundreds of these to make the kind of difference
that ultimately is needed.
So carbon capture and sequestration may be part of the long-run
solution. It is going to be approximately zero of what we need to do
over the next critical ten to twenty years that I was describing earlier.
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So that gets me to where I think the real optimism lies. It is on the
energy efficiency front and it is on the renewable energy front.
Why am I optimistic here? I am optimistic because of what we are
already seeing coming out of the laboratories, but, more importantly,
what is actually happening in the marketplace.
Energy efficiency, as was mentioned earlier, has improved dra-
matically in most countries over the last thirty years. We have re-
cently begun to pick up in the numbers. In the last three years, since
oil prices began their march to the sky, there has been a clear shift
upward in the level of effort going into energy efficiency. In fact,
the U.S. economy has grown substantially over the last three to four
years with only minimal increase in energy use. And you see that
throughout most of the industrialized world.
McKinsey & Company, no group of raving environmentalists, re-
cently argued in a major report that if we were - and McKinsey
believes that we can - to take the annual rate of improvement of
global energy efficiency from 1 percent per year, which has been the
historical norm for the last couple of decades, and move that up to 2
percent per year, we could avoid an amount of carbon emissions that
would be equivalent to several of those large wedges that the Prince-
ton scientists have presented. 6  You would see improvements in
automobiles, in buildings, in power plants, in industries, etc.
Most of the energy system is waste. I don't know how many of
you have seen those flow charts that show the energy input at one
end and the end use at the other, but the biggest flow coming out the
back end is something called waste heat. Waste heat is the predomi-
nant thing that we produce in our energy system today. So we are
going to be able to continue improving that efficiency for a very long
time.
Let me mention just two key elements that I think are not getting
the attention they need.
One is buildings. Buildings are really the big energy hogs today.
Most of them are not built very efficiently. It's a classic example of
market failures. There is an enormous potential, highly economical,
where the extra investment up front is more than paid for in lower
energy bills.
5. See id.
6. McKinsey Global Institute, The Case for Investing in Energy Productivity
9 (February 2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/In-
vestingEnergyProductivity/InvestingEnergyProductivity.pdf.
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One of the great things that has begun to happen again in these last
few magic years, with the combination of high oil prices and concern
about climate change, is that around the world at the national level
and at the local level, there are policies being developed, and there
are initiatives on the part of individual companies and industries, to
create a whole new generation of buildings that are going to be much
more comfortable as well as much, much more energy-efficient than
those that are in place today.
Secondly, I think we are really on the edge of a sea change in the
nature of automobiles. The internal combustion engine is transition-
ing to hybrid, which is then going to transition to plug-in hybrids.
That is, you'll still have an internal combustion engine, but you can
plug it in at night. You can do your city driving, forty-fifty miles,
without using your engine at all. That then transitions, using this
wonderful array of new, more economical batteries that are coming
out, to an all-electric vehicle in the future. Electric motors are vastly
more efficient than internal combustion engines. The power plants
that produce that power, even today, are more efficient than internal
combustion engines.
But of course, the other thing that is really exciting - and this is
my segue - is that once you are running your automobiles on elec-
tricity, you don't necessarily have to get that electricity from fossil
fuels.
The other thing that I think is just really stunning, if you look at
the numbers and what has begun to develop over the last few years,
is the skyrocketing development of renewable sources of energy.
There has been work going on, both technologically and commer-
cially, on things like wind, solar, geothermal, and bioenergy over the
last thirty years. But what is happening now is the combination of
political commitment, starting mainly in Europe but now spreading
outward to the rest of the world, and the fact that the technologies
have matured.
You've got a whole lot of new players jumping into those fields,
including virtually all of the really big companies that are in the en-
ergy business - General Electric, Siemens, Mitsubishi, Shell, and
BP. Combined with this, and this gets back to my earlier analogy
with the information technology revolution, the thing that I think is
most stunning and will have the biggest impact is that renewable
energy is now literally the hottest thing in Silicon Valley. I would
argue that at some level it is hotter than the Internet. I mean you tell
somebody in Silicon Valley, particularly in the venture capital sec-
tor, that you are working in renewable energy, and you've suddenly
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got a string of emails and voice mails saying, "I really want to talk to
you because this is where my firm is now putting its interest."
There are dozens of startup firms now being created to develop
new solar technologies, new wind technologies, new bioenergy tech-
nologies, and new geothermal technologies.
And these industries are growing fast. The biofuels industry is
growing at 25 percent per year. The wind industry is growing at 30
percent per year. The solar photovoltaics industry in the last three
years has grown at over 40 percent per year, with every sign that it is
going to be faster than that over the next three years.
This is a whole new generation of modular, mass-produced energy
technologies, operating by an entirely different paradigm from the
large, centralized, fossil-fuel-based energy systems that are in place
today. As these markets grow, the costs are going to come down and
they are going to come down very, very rapidly as a result of the
profits that are now available to put into research and development,
but also as a result of the fact that you just have a greater scale of
production, with mass production of various technologies.
So I think we are now really getting to the point where I can liter-
ally envision a day within five to ten years, based on the trends I see
in the marketplace, where most of the new generating capacity is
going to be renewable. Already in both Europe and North America,
if you look at, not the total stock of power plants, but the new ones
being brought online, number one are natural gas-fired power plants
over the last couple years, but number two is wind power. Coal
comes after wind. Nuclear is barely even on the list.
These markets are shifting. Very few people are aware of this be-
cause there is a tendency to look at the total stock of plants rather
than what is happening in the marketplace today. But I think we
could be in a place, five to ten years from now, where we find that
virtually all of the new capacity is coming from the new sources. It
is that kind of a transformation that we are on the verge of.
Now, let me shift to the policy questions. I think particularly, the
presentation that we heard earlier on the European Union's policies
was very enlightening in terms of understanding what has been go-
ing on in the part of the world that has really driven our markets
most dramatically, particularly during the 1990s, but even in the last
five or six years. I think there are two points I want to leave you
with on policy.
One is that pricing of carbon is terribly important. Pricing carbon
either through a carbon tax, or I think in the near term, more likely
through carbon regulation, which some people like to call "cap and
240 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWREVIEW
trade" (fundamentally regulating carbon emissions and then allowing
tradability among the polluters) I think is terribly important. Putting
that price out there does make efficiency and renewable energy
sources, potentially nuclear power, more economical than they oth-
erwise would be.
It also just gives a signal. Everybody who is in a business that
emits, which is essentially every business, is now thinking about
carbon. They are thinking about what they are doing. They are at
least measuring their emissions. They are beginning to control their
emissions. So I think it is terribly important.
The second message I want to leave you with is that pricing carbon
is not in itself the full solution, not even close. There is not a single
policy bullet that solves this problem.
I think there are a lot of people, particularly a lot of neoclassical
economists, who think it is. The reason it is not is that anyone who
has studied energy markets closely and followed them over the last
couple of decades knows that the lack of a full and reflective price is
not the full problem. These are not markets that operate along neo-
classical lines.
These are complex markets. There are institutional structures that
cause things to be a certain way. There are impediments to invest-
ment in various areas. There are all kinds of manipulations that have
been put in place by legislatures around the world at the behest of
one or more interest groups. So you are not going to see a technol-
ogy transformation just by pricing.
The best example of that is in the real world. The Europeans cur-
rently have a tax on gasoline that is the equivalent of over $100 a ton
of carbon, well beyond what any policymaker could consider im-
plementing because of the cries of consumers. Now, Europe is far
more efficient. The cars are more efficient. There is not the level of
inefficiency that there is in the United States. But Europe has paid
that price and has not reinvented the car. It has also not abandoned
the car. It is still putting out plenty of automobile-related carbon
dioxide emissions. The reason is that there are a lot of other things
that need to be done, probably even more so in the electricity sector
than is true in the automotive sector.
That brings me to a couple of specific policies. Again, these are
just going to be illustrative of the kind of thing that I think is going
to be needed.
[VOL. XIX
2009] FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM KEYNOTE ADDRESS 241
The European Directive on Renewable Energy,7 is, I think, a huge
step forward - making these requirements legally binding is a huge
step. But essentially, the problem that the European Union has is
that only a handful of European countries have made the enormous
strides in renewable energy over the last few decades, led by Ger-
many and Spain. It used to be led by Denmark, but the Danes have
unfortunately lost their political commitment to this more recently.
But Germany and Spain have really led and dominated the develop-
ment of solar energy, wind power, and, increasingly, bioenergy in
Europe.
Why have they done that? It's not that they are the only countries
that have wanted to move forward, that have had national goals that
they have put in place. What they have had is a very specific law. I
am now turning with these policy recommendations to the many
lawyers and soon-to-be lawyers in this room, because I think there is
a lot of work for all of you.
The Germans created a law, passed originally by the German Par-
liament in 1991, called an Electricity Feed Law, which basically said
that there will be a minimum price required to be paid by the electric
utilities, passed on to electricity consumers, for generators of renew-
able electricity.
8
What that did was it got at one of the key institutional impedi-
ments. The big utilities don't like renewable energy. It's basically
competition for them. They are selling less of the coal and nuclear
power that is the main asset that they own. They have tended to re-
sist change in virtually every country around the world, whether it is
the United States or China.
This pushed them out of the ability to block progress. It created a
wonderful new set of industries. Now, it came at a cost. It did cause
very minor increases in the price of electricity, though since even the
coal and the nuclear are heavily subsidized in Europe, it turned out
to be not that much of a penalty.
Germany and Spain, between them, have totally dominated these
industries in Europe, totally dominate European exports - and the
Danes to some extent too because of the earlier laws that they used
to have in place.
7. Council Directive 2003/30, art. 17, 2001 O.J. (L 123) (EC).
8. Wind-Works.org, The Original Electricity Feed Law in Germany (Paul
Gipe, trans., 2001), http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/Germany/ARTsDE.
html.
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Europe's challenge now, if I may put it so simply, is basically to
figure out - and other countries may come up with different solu-
tions - but I think increasingly it is accepted that that Danish-
German-Spanish model is the one that is pretty dam economically
efficient and works pretty darn well, by allowing power to be auto-
matically sold into the grid by setting a legal price that incorporates
the environmental externalities and by relieving the small renewable
generators of the need to negotiate contracts with giant electric utili-
ties that have a natural economic interest in not wanting to add com-
petition.
So that is one policy. Electricity feed laws, which were hardly
even known in the United States, are now actually being looked at
very seriously at the state level in a number of areas.
We are still looking mainly at legal mandates in about half the
states for the utilities to introduce renewable electricity. That has
actually worked quite well in a number of states. In fact, the United
States is now actually ahead of Germany, though not ahead of
Europe, in wind power installations over the last two years. These
European systems I think have really worked particularly well.
And then similarly on the energy efficiency side, standards and
regulations are things that are very much going to be needed - en-
ergy standards for buildings, fuel economy standards for automo-
biles.
I think this is terribly important. We are going to have to have a
complex matrix of policies, which need to be designed in a way that
they are market-sensitive, that they work with the market, not against
it. Carbon pricing has to be part of it, but I think only one piece of a
broader array of policy elements that need to be put in place.
Again, I think if you are going to look at any model in the world
today, it would be the European Union, because not only at the EU
level but at the national level in Europe you have the world's only
really fully functioning carbon market now - carbon is bought and
sold among the major polluters in Europe today - but, in addition,
you have this rich array of other policies that are moving forward,
again both at the national and at the European Union level.
I want to conclude by focusing on what I would describe as the
global bargain that needs to be struck on these issues. Of course we
are focusing in this conference particularly on north-south issues.
Those indeed have been the critical sticking points in the climate
issue over the last almost eighteen years that the world has been
working to move forward, first through the framework convention,
then the Kyoto Protocol, and now on a post-Kyoto agreement.
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Of course the problem in simple terms is clear. That is, per-capita
emissions even in China are less than one-quarter the U.S. level, and
in many African countries and in a country like India they are one-
tenth the U.S. level.9 Those countries are developing rapidly. Their
emissions are going to naturally tend to grow much more rapidly
than in the United States.
And yet, I think everybody recognizes, including most people in
developing countries today, that they need to limit their emissions
growth as well. We are now past a point where industrial countries
totally dominate emissions. Going forward, developing countries are
going to be more and more important. Bringing them more force-
fully into the international agreements and accelerating the adoption
of this array of new technologies in the developing countries I think
is absolutely critical.
Now, the developing countries themselves are at very different
stages of economic development and contribute at very different lev-
els to this problem. I think this needs to really be recognized and
grappled with in the next round of negotiations.
The ones that are most critical are China and India, with China, at
least in the short run, being a good deal more important than India.
You have probably all seen the studies.
China, by various calculations, either will very soon pass the
United States in global greenhouse gas emissions or may indeed
have already passed the United States last year. China, suddenly and
dramatically, in the last few years has entered a much more energy-
intensive stage of its economic development. Ten percent economic
growth continues, but the energy growth has greatly accelerated.
And China, being a largely coal-based economy, is getting most of
that energy from the dirtiest of all energy sources, coal.
So China really needs to be brought into this agreement, as do a
number of other rapidly industrializing developing countries. I think
that unless they are, we are not going to get the kind of agreement
that is necessary.
And frankly, I think there is basically sort of a two-way process
now, where the United States and a number of other industrial coun-
tries are going to be very reluctant politically to move forward with-
out China being in the boat. But from China's point of view, one of
9. Energy Info. Admin., Dept. of Energy, World Per Capita Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005, avail-
able at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/intemational/iealf/tablehlcco2.xls.
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the main reasons that China is holding out so far on adopting any
carbon limits and has been resistant - again, I think we did see
some movement over the last couple of weeks - is that they see the
United States as not playing its role, not being a responsible indus-
trial country. I think if the United States were doing what the Euro-
pean countries and Japan are already doing, China would be much
more likely to move forward.
But on the China question I am optimistic, and I have a reason to
be optimistic. I was actually in Beijing last week meeting with Chi-
nese officials at the same time that world leaders were here meeting
at the United Nations. I find remarkable change under way in think-
ing in China on this issue. This is both in the urgency of the problem
- you know, half of Shanghai would be under water if you get ten
feet of sea level rise. China is incredibly vulnerable in terms of
shortages of fresh water and a country that is relatively short on agri-
cultural resources generally. But more importantly, I think China
sees an enormous opportunity to be gained by getting off of this
really unhealthy dependence on coal as quickly as it possibly can.
China has done an amazing thing over the last few years. Again,
many people are not aware of this. I have just been referring with
some praise to what Europe has done in renewable energy. But the
most recent story that has gotten my attention is what has happened
in China. China passed a renewable energy law, a serious one, for
the first time in 2005.10
Most countries, including most European countries, often stumble
coming out of the starting blocks with a major new law, particularly
with the kind of complexity and the kind of political resistance that
tends to exist with renewable energy development. I can go down a
long list of European countries that have sadly disappointed, from
the United Kingdom to Italy, where the rhetoric over a period of fif-
teen years has far outrun the ability to actually deliver market devel-
opment.
The Chinese now are less than two years into the entry of this new
law into force. The renewable energy markets are absolutely boom-
ing. China is already the number one country in solar hot water. It
is number one in small hydro development. Both of those develop-
ments actually predate the law. But since the law has developed,
10. Renewable Energy Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l Peo-
ple's Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.renewableenergyaccess.com/assets/download/China RE Law_05.doc.
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they have come out of nowhere to become, last year, the fifth-largest
country in wind power installations. They will probably be three
this year. They will probably be number one within the next two to
three years.
And in solar photovoltaics, which is a technology that is basically
too expensive for the Chinese market, an amazing thing has hap-
pened. A bunch of Chinese companies have started up, new entre-
preneurial companies, with some help from the Chinese government,
some help from local provincial governments, some help from West-
ern financial firms, such as Goldman Sachs, and some of them have
even gone public on the New York Stock Exchange. China now is
on pace. They have already passed the United States, which basi-
cally invented this technology back in the 1950s. They are actually
on pace now to overtake Japan, which has been the number one
country in this technology over the last half-dozen years.
So I think that there is a global bargain to be had, but it has to be
based on a combination of moral understanding of the fact that the
developing countries are going to be hurt the most, that they have so
far contributed relatively little to this problem, and that the industrial
countries have a responsibility to take the lead. But secondly, it
needs to be based, and can be based, on a realistic understanding that
countries - not just China, but potentially India, potentially South-
east Asia, potentially Latin America, potentially Africa - can create
enormous economic success by developing 21' t century energy tech-
nologies, by leapfrogging many parts of the industrial age, and by
moving straight on to a set of technologies that are just becoming
available now.
Now, too many people that sounds like a pipedream, because the
conventional view is, again, that these technologies are too expen-
sive, there is too much high technology required. But I have a sim-
ple analogy for you. Go into a remote village in Africa today and
you are quite likely to see mobile phones and perhaps an Internet
caf6, probably the availability of television, perhaps being powered
with a solar system, which is increasingly true in many remote areas,
in areas that never had landline telephones, that have never seen a
mainframe computer, that have literally leapfrogged into a different
kind of information technology.
I think it can be done. Indeed, I think it will be done.
The thing that I think is so important about what is happening in
China in renewable energy today is something called the "China
price." Anybody involved in manufacturing anywhere in the world
knows what the China price is.
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The China price is when your buyer comes to you and says, "I
want you to lower your prices by 20 percent. That's what I'm de-
manding."
The manufacturer says, "Well, I'm sorry. I'd like to do that, but I
can only lower my price by 10 percent because I can't afford to go to
20 percent."
The buyer turns to the manufacturer and says, "I need that price.
That is the China price." That means that's the price he will be able
to get that technology for if he buys in China.
Go down the list - computers, television, toys - I think we are
going to see automobiles. Increasingly, the Chinese have been able
to get to levels of price that have not been possible to envision in the
West in manufacturing sector after manufacturing sector.
As we make this transition, and as a low-carbon energy economy
comes about, low-cost, highly efficient energy-using technologies
and energy-generating technologies, like wind power and photovol-
taics, this dramatic emergence of China into this sector is going to
make a huge difference.
So I think China not only has the potential to turn the comer on
these skyrocketing emissions that it is polluting its own country with
today and polluting the global atmosphere, but I think that those very
low prices that are going to be delivered are going to push this entire
sector of new technologies over a threshold, a threshold that will not
only make them affordable in Beijing - anything affordable in Bei-
jing is by definition affordable in New York - but I think we may
even see it get to the point where it is economical in very poor coun-
tries like those in Africa, in areas where the fossil fuel economy
never was affordable.
So I think we stand on the cusp of a potentially grand transforma-
tion. I think that it needs to involve a partnership between north and
south. I think it needs to involve a recognition that technology and
policy are not different things but really two sides of the same coin,
and where technology change and lifestyle change - that is, lower
consumption - also are not two distinct things but, again, part of
the same integrated solution.
We need more public transportation. We need more personal re-
sponsibility. But we need that embedded in a different kind of en-
ergy system, one that does not depend on fossil fuels for its life-
blood.
Thank you very much.
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Question & Answer
QUESTION: As you move toward electric vehicles, especially
trucks, to what extent do you see that that may necessitate an ex-
panded use of the traditional lead acid battery?
MR. FLAVIN: I think you are going to see virtually no expansion
of the lead acid battery. There are much better batteries. I think you
are going to be hearing about one of them, a nickel metal hydride,
this afternoon from Nancy Bacon. There also are lithium batteries
and a range of other alternatives.
Chemists have been struggling for a hundred years to develop bet-
ter batteries, with relatively little success. I think we are really on
the verge of a breakthrough now, partly because we have so many
mobile devices, things like mobile phones and laptop computers, and
the automobile will basically be able to draw off a lot of the technol-
ogy that has gone into those sectors.
QUESTION: A very short question about the global bargain.
What is your opinion about the cost and convergence theory that has
been proposed by the Common Future Institute since the early
1990s?
MR. FLAVIN: Can you elaborate in one sentence what that prin-
ciple is?
QUESTIONER: The principle is the allocation of the carbon
emissions on an equal basis to every inhabitant of the planet. This
would be a highly equitable way of going about it. You were talking
about this leapfrogging and a moral understanding among nations.
Then it is important to understand the history of the origin of the
problem.
MR. FLAVIN: I think that, from an idealistic point of view, that is
a wonderful strategy. I think a moral philosopher would have a very
hard time disagreeing with it.
I think it is, frankly, a nonstarter politically. The world is not go-
ing to agree to the kind of large-scale redistribution of income that
that would require.
I think that what we need is certainly some redistribution of in-
come as part of this process - I would not argue against that - but
I think, inevitably, it is going to take a hundred years, at minimum,
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to actually get to the sort of level playing field in terms of carbon
emissions.
Countries start at very, very different levels today. There are a lot
of accidents of history. Countries have a lot of emissions - for ex-
ample, China - because they happen to have a lot of coal. There
are a lot of poor African countries that just don't happen to have a lot
of fossil fuels, so they have not developed it in part for that reason.
I think that addressing it as a purely equity issue is not going to get
to that win/win economic opportunity framework, which I think,
frankly, is the only way we are going to politically move forward.
QUESTION: I think your talk was a marvelous one, but somewhat
more optimistic than I would have expected. I am reminded of the
famous saying of Pogo, that lovable cartoon character, with regard to
pollution: "We have met the enemy, and they is us."
How can you get the American consumer and the American voter
to accept the high level of taxation that the Europeans take for
granted, which obviously is one of the most effective ways of reduc-
ing the number of cars or the use of cars? How do you get the
American consumer or the American voter to accept the enormous
subsidies for trains that enabled the high-velocity trains in Europe
and simultaneously promote less use of cars and planes? How in-
deed do you get the American consumer to accept electric cars?
What is the campaign, the marketing campaign, that is necessary to
make Americans accept a change in the American way of life and
change to a greener outlook on life?
MR. FLAVIN: I think the key to that very good question is that
you have to be making the efficiency improvements as you go along.
You are absolutely right, the taxpayer is not going to accept a mas-
sive increase in taxes if it is not compensated for (1) by offsets, re-
ductions in taxes elsewhere, which I think needs to be part of the
bargain - you know, if you are reducing labor taxes, for example,
income taxes, at the same time that you are raising energy taxes.
(2) You need to improve efficiency levels. If you are paying twice
as much for electricity but your house is twice as efficient, your bill
is just the same. This is something that Amory Lovins has been
pointing out for a very long time. In fact, a lot of people are realiz-
ing that.
Those who chose to buy a Prius four years ago are paying a third
as much for fuel as those that chose to buy a very inefficient auto-
mobile. That was not a tax increase. That was basically the world
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oil market has added the equivalent of well north of $30 a ton. We
have had a substantial carbon tax imposed on the oil market just as a
result of market forces. People have basically accepted that.
So it needs to be integrated in a way that people are seeing that
there is some reward from this, that it is not just an effort to raise
taxes, but that there really is something to be achieved as a result.
I don't disagree that the political hurdles to making these changes
are tremendous. But I also think that there are going to be tipping
points in the policy and marketplace as well as in the climate.
Things at some point get easier once the basic policy structure is in
place, once these new technologies start to become economically
competitive.Unless we can maintain a certain level of optimism that in fact we
can solve this very difficult problem - I think the more serious con-
cern today is not that the world is totally in denial, as it was two or
three years ago, that we go straight from denial to despair. That
doesn't get us anywhere either.
QUESTION: There have been a couple questions about popula-
tion, and you've alluded to the growth from 6 billion to possibly 9
billion. I'm not sensing on the list of issues that are discussed here
today where the population factor fits in the level of urgency. Can
you please address that?
MR. FLAVIN: Absolutely. It's interesting that the only national
climate plan that I've read recently that directly addressed the issue
of population was the Chinese plan. China noted the role of popula-
tion growth and indicated, and took credit for the fact, that the dra-
matic slowing in population growth in China over the last several
decades will mean that there are less emissions than there would
otherwise be.
Now on the other hand, of course, if Chairman Mao had not pro-
moted large families back in the 1950s and 1960s, there would not
be 1.3 billion Chinese, which is part of the problem both that they
have and the world has today.
Population is absolutely a key factor and, I think, should be part of
national strategies; that is, slowing population growth.
One little secret that the Europeans don't like to mention is that-
this is certainly not the only reason, and I am not taking anything
away from the strong policies they have in place - but one big ad-
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vantage they have had over the United States in the Kyoto Protocol"
numbers is that the European population is essentially flat, it is
barely growing at all; whereas the U.S. population is actually grow-
ing almost at the rate of the world as a whole. We've got a rate of
about 0.6-0.7 percent a year. That actually adds up over the seven-
teen years since the Kyoto baseline went into force.
Now, obviously there are a variety of reasons, most of which do
not relate to conscious policy, that population growth rates are much
slower in Europe than they are in the United States. The United
States, by the way, has about the same population growth rate as
China does today. Again, the country would have a lot easier time if
it had a slower rate of population growth.
Since it is the combination of population and per capita emissions
that essentially determines how much carbon dioxide you are putting
out, one can easily make a case that population growth in the United
States is one of the biggest single variables in the global carbon di-
oxide equation, because one new American actually produces vastly
more emissions than one new African. Of course, Africa has one of
the highest population growth rates in the world, but because its per
capita emissions are so much lower, population growth in the.United
States is actually a bigger problem for the climate than population
growth in Africa.
QUESTION: I was particularly intrigued by the portion of your
talk about leapfrogging technologies and the parallels you drew with
the information communications technology industry. But I'm won-
dering. The two kinds of technologies are so very different, and cur-
rently there really isn't an economic basis necessarily that I can see
where you could say that renewables will be at that point. I was
wondering if you could talk a little bit more about that, or perhaps
some policies that might bring it to that level, where we might be
able to leapfrog in renewables as well.
MR. FLAVIN: Sure. You're absolutely right that you will never
see energy efficiency doubling every eighteen months. Chip speed
has been doubling every eighteen months since the 1950s. That's an
extraordinary rate of progress that only occurs when you are actually
11. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, U.N. Doc: FCCP/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
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detached from the physical world, as you are with computer technol-
ogy, at least to some degree.
You are not going to see that rate of improvement, but you are go-
ing to see very rapid improvement. Here's an example. It is basi-
cally said, on average in the manufacturing sector, that for every
doubling of the rate of annual production you get a 10-15 percent
cost reduction. That has been observed across a wide variety of very
familiar technologies, like televisions and computers, 10 percent to
15 percent for every doubling.
The production of photovoltaics worldwide is now doubling every
twenty-four months. That's a 10-15 percent decline in cost every
twenty-four months. Now, we are not actually seeing that yet in the
marketplace, and the reason is because the demand has grown so
rapidly that there is basically a shortage of supply. So the prices
actually have gone up in the last two or three years. Everybody rec-
ognizes that that is a temporary anomaly.
There is so much capacity coming online - I saw one estimate
that we may see an eight-to-nine-fold increase in photovoltaics
manufacturing capacity, unprecedented levels, within just the next
three to four years. There is going to be a glut created at some point,
because I don't think - you know, basically you have two or three
markets that are basically holding this up - Germany, Japan, Cali-
fornia, Spain - and the policy process I think is not going to keep
up. So you are going to end up with a glut of photovoltaics.
That is going to cause the prices to crash. It will almost certainly
cause a bit of a shakeout in the market. But what is it going to do?
It is going to be exactly like what happened at the end of the dot-com
bubble.
One of the things that happened with the dot-coin bubble is there
was all of this fiber optic capacity that had been built. It was vastly
overbuilt. Suddenly, the companies that owned a lot of that literally
went out of business and you could buy fiber optic capacity for vir-
tually zero. That, as Tom Friedman has reported in his recent book,
rather than being the demise of the industry, was the absolute fuel
that caused it to take off. 12 Suddenly, there was all of this incredi-
bly cheap fiber out there, which caused the Internet now to diffuse
and to spread into all kinds of new applications and took the growth
into a totally different realm.
12. THOMAs. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD is FLAT 3.0: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
21 ST CENTURY (2007).
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I am about as sure as I can be sure of anything that we are going to
see something very much like that with photovoltaics.
This is an amazing technology, because you can do it at any scale,
from a handheld calculator or a camera to a large 1000-megawatt
power plant in the middle of a desert. Costs get low enough and you
can start putting them up anywhere and everywhere.
So I think that we are getting very close to that kind of a point. We
don't need to get to quite the pace of change that we see in semicon-
ductors to create an energy revolution.
It is partly that we are up against dinosaurs. I mean everybody
finds Exxon and the National Coal Association sort of intimidating.
They are big and they are lumbering and they have a lot of market
share. The bigger the dinosaur, the harder they fall. We have seen
that in industry after industry. Frankly, I wouldn't want to be one of
the major investors in one of those businesses.
Thank you all very much.
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